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A Review of the Literature
I.

Foreword

Extant literature on the field of secession is comparatively sparse, relative to other fields
of political science. The majority of literature on secession occupies one of two general
categories. The first focuses on a singular case study (e.g., only Tamils in only Sri Lanka, or only
Catalans in only Spain),1 either lending no material toward a broader explanatory modeling or
else producing a rudimentary explanatory model tailored only to the case in question. That is, it
explains why the author believes the secessionist movement has organized in that state but
includes events and groups that exist only within that state and thus are so specific as to lack
parsimony. The second category produces an explanatory model, but typically attempts to
demonstrate why a movement is successful rather than why it originates.2
Other writings occupy even smaller niches, such as Buchanan’s Toward a Theory of
Secession, in which, rather than proposing a theory of secession, he merely laments the lack of a
theory of secession and later propounds on when a group ought to secede.3 Still others, as with
Ryan Griffiths’ celebrated book Age of Secession, beautifully collate instances of secession from
all over the world, but look only at the response of the central state to the seceding entity. While
this strategy is useful in explaining why some movements are successful based on how the center
reacts to their presence, it too ignores the origins of the movements. Finally, there exists a class
of scholars, typified by Nicholas Sambanis,4 who study secession and autonomy but who explain
only differences in the resultant arrangements in newly independent states, rather than exploring
what drives the impulse to make a newly independent state.
II.

Decentralization

Not only is the field split on the origins of secession, but also on whether certain
variables, decentralization for example, promote or discourage secession. Ornstein and Coursen
posit that decentralization has an ameliorative effect on secessionist movements because, in
theory, it gives the movements at least most of what they want: political autonomy and control
over cultural and societal aspects.5 Kymlicka on the other hand suggests that decentralization
actually emboldens secessionist movements, thus increasing their desire for complete
independence.6 Brancati strikes a middle ground, relating a series of variables to whether

1

See, e.g., Luke Learie, Identity and Secession in the Caribbean: Tobago vs. Trinidad, 1889-1980, University of the
West Indies Press, 2007; Welhengama and Pillay, The Rise of Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka.
2
See, e.g., Bridget Coggins, “Friends in High Places: International Politics and the Emergence of States from
Secessionism” in International Organization, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Summer 2011), pp. 433-467.
3
Allen Buchanan, “Toward a Theory of Secession” in Ethics, Vol. 101, No. 2 (January 1991), pp. 322-42.
4
See also, “What’s In A Line? Is Partition the Solution to Civil War?” (with Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl) in
International Security 34 (2) (Fall 2009), pp. 82-118, “Explaining Regional Autonomy Differences in Decentralized
Countries” (with Branko Milanovic) in Comparative Political Studies 47: 1830-1855 (2014).
5
Norman Ornstein and Kimberly Coursen, “As the World Turns Democratic: Federalism Finds Favor” in American
Enterprise, 1992.
6
Will Kymlicka, “Is Federalism a Viable Alternative to Secessionism?” from Theories of Secessionism, ed. Percy
Lehning, NY: Routledge Press, 1998.
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decentralization tamps down secessionism or exacerbates it.7 Clearly there is spirited debate in
the scholarly community on this topic, and on many others, within the field of secession.
III.

Economic Analysis

Another class of literature purports to explain secessionist ideation from a purely
economic standpoint. In Robert Young’s “The Political Economy of Secession: The Case of
Quebec”, for example, Young traces economic rationales in explaining why well-developed,
liberal economies infrequently experience secession.8 Curiously, in the same article he also
happens upon the rationale for why a purely economic explanation does not work, or at least is
not a comprehensive explanation.9 Indeed, in exploring the differences between the 1980 and
1995 independence referenda in Quebec, Young in another work lays the framework for
concluding that status concerns are more salient even in well-developed, liberal economies than
are material concerns.* Other explanations connecting autonomist and secessionist movements to
economic rationales include Sambanis and Milanovic’s “Explaining Regional Autonomy
Differences in Decentralized Countries”, Hechter’s Internal colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in
British National Development and Ragin’s “Ethnic political mobilization: The Welsh Case”.
IV.

Beginnings of Comprehensive Explanation

One work which does attempt to explain secessionist rationales is Sorens’ Secessionism.10
Though relatively comprehensive in number of cases considered, there is not a concise
formalization, but rather a haphazard jumbling of variables which even intuitively seem not to
have a direct bearing on secessionism.11 Similarly, in Wood’s “Secession: A Comparative
Analytical Framework”, he too recognizes an “economic precondition” to secession but admits
that this economic facet appears not to obtain in some cases.12 Rather than examining the other
commonalities between instances of secessionism, he attributes this apparent discrepancy to a Jcurve, wherein this discrepancy can be explained away in instances in which economic disparity
is either not disparate enough or too disparate.13 Nevertheless, to his credit, Wood also
recognizes other preconditions, namely political and cultural, which supplement his account.14
Curiously, though, he never formalizes these preconditions into a working theory, instead merely
noting apparent commonalities.
One rather clever attempt at explaining secession is Bartkus’s 1999 The Dynamics of
Secession which attributes secession to four criteria: “a distinct community, territory, leaders,
and discontent.”15 Nevertheless, there are two conceptual problems with such a definition.
Dawn Brancati, “Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conflict and
Secessionism?” in International Organization 60, 2006.
8
Robert Young, “The Political Economy of Secession: The Case of Quebec” in Constitutional Political Economy
5(2):1994.
9
Ibid, p. 289.
*
I will elaborate more on this fascinating prospect later in this piece. The basis for my claim is taken from Robert
Young’s The Struggle for Quebec: From Referendum to Referendum?, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press,
1999.
10
Jason Sorens, Secessionism: Identity, Interest, and Strategy, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012.
11
E.g. “access to the sea” as one variable. (Ibid, p. 61).
12
John Wood, “Secession: A Comparative Analytical Framework” in Canadian Journal of Political Science 14(1):
1981, p. 116.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid, generally.
15
Viva Bartkus, The Dynamics of Secession, UK: University Press, Cambridge, 1999.
7
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Primarily, it does not explain why secessionism first forms in the minds of the members of that
“distinct community”. That is, secessionism intuitively can exist in an inchoate form without
organized leadership, and Bartkus’s criteria do not account for it. What Bartkus has described is
a necessary component of successful secessionist movements. This dilutes the original
motivations of the broad-based sentiment by examining motivations and behaviors of the
political elite. Second, lumping all motivating factors into “discontent” is too ambiguous to be
useful in formal modeling. Griffith too, in his Age of Secession, recognizes economic, territorial,
and community components to secession, but notes no such discontent component which would
catalyse secessionism.16
V.

Analysis of Success in Movements

Other notable works include Coggins’ “The History of Secession” which, though a
brilliant improvement upon earlier attempts to collate secessionist movements, offers explanation
only for the success or lack thereof of a particular movement.17 Still other works combine
multiple pieces by different authors into one book which typically offers fascinating insights into
a number of cases, but, due to the specificity employed and the distinctiveness the authors wish
to maintain, these pieces necessarily cannot connect each case into an overarching explanatory
model.18
VI.

Normative Theory

A final category of literature expresses purely normative views on when, if ever,
secession is justified. Kai Neilsen’s “Secession: The Case of Quebec” is a prime example of this
type of normative literature.19 In using Quebec as a case typical of all secessions, Nielsen
considers the morality of minority self-identity and the import of preserving their cultures. One
classic example of normative writings is Harry Beran’s “A Liberal Theory of Secession”, in
which he delivers a striking admonition to scholars to consider the topic of secession more
closely.20 Another, more subtle normative work on this theme is Bagwell’s “Yugoslavian
Constitutional Questions” which diverges from the normal moral and ethical dilemmas involved
in secession and instead opts for a legalistic approach.21 While these writings have intrinsic value
from a legal and moral perspective, they obviously do not add substance to the discussion of the
emergence of the movements themselves.
VII.

Whither Secession Theory?

The lack of comprehensive, explanatory writing focusing on the origins of secessionist
movements has left a noticeable hole in the literature. Although secession, even today, is one of
the phenomena with the most concrete impacts in political science, we are without a satisfying
16

Ryan Griffiths, Age of Secession: The International and Domestic Determinants of State Birth, UK: University
Press, Cambridge, 2016.
17
Bridget Coggins, The History of Secession: An Overview from The Ashgate Research Companion to Secession
Routledge, 2011.
18
See generally Secessionist Movements in Comparative Politics, The Rise of Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka,
Secessionism and the European Union.
19
Kai Nielsen, “Secession: The Case of Quebec” in Journal of Applied Philosophy 10(1): 1993.
20
Harry Beran, “A Liberal Theory of Secession” in Political Studies 32, 1984.
21
Ben Bagwell, “Yugoslavian Constitutional Questions: Self-Determination and Secession of Member Republics”
in Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 21(3), 1991.
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model explaining its origins and the rationales of the individuals who precipitate it. My work will
seek to answer these questions by employing case studies with data which I have collected
personally and which I have recovered from historical documents. I will then connect these case
studies through an overarching framework, attempting in the process to explain all movements as
a function of the sentiment at the popular level which arises based on three variables. The virtue
of this model is that it is parsimonious and may be applied to any case of secession or be used to
explain any instance of secessionism.
One common misconception in a great deal of literature22 is that a theory of secession
needs to include rationales for why some movements are successful while others are not. These
works usually concentrate on the role of international actors in recognizing and sustaining
secessionist movements. The problem at the nucleus of this assumption is that there are at least
as many (and probably more) variables at play as there are cases of secessionism. For example,
the degree to which the state utilizes repressive force, the geographic concentration of the
movement(s), and, in our times, the availability of social media saturation for these movements.
Happily, a theory of secession does not necessitate a priori a predictive model which
examines the probability of secession given these variables. It need only assert that all secession
movements possess the same qualities in their initial state. If these qualities are found in each
such initial state and their presence can be shown to be in some way causal, it is identical to
saying that all secessionist sentiment originates from those qualities. This would be true whether
the movements are demonstrably successful, in process, or are failures (in the case of central
state repression, e.g.). As a result, in understanding secession as a phenomenon, these origins are
more important to trace than state response or international bolstering. I suggest that these
origins are indeed ubiquitous in secession and that they are definitionally causal.

What is Secession?
That definitions of secession number nearly as many as the scholars who discuss them
provides evidence of the difficulty in defining the concept with exactitude. The following
definition governs this text. A.) In any secession there must be a discrete, separable territory
occupied by a people who are in some way distinctive from the remainder of the whole, or a
distinct part of a whole when a union includes multiple parts, and B.) in a secession one
constituent part, the seceding entity, of a larger amalgamation withdraws from the whole leaving
behind the rump entity, leaving two independent entities which are significantly less integrated
than before. This definition does not include forced separation initiated by the central state
(‘downsizing’), especially without the constituent part’s consent, as occurs, for example, in some
decolonizations. It also excludes all forms of territorial autonomy, whether federal or devolved.
‘Internal secessions’, however, will operate under the same principles as any other secession.
This paper seeks first to identify the common factors among all secessions. Next, it proposes
a structure for determining what might catalyze mere secessionist tendencies into a full-fledged
movement – that is, what separates a secession from separatist sentiments or inchoate forms of
the ethos of independence that eventually fizzle out or are otherwise unsuccessful to date – using
several historical examples. Finally, I will conduct regression analysis of polling data collected
See, e.g., David Siroky, “Explaining Secession” from The Ashgate Research Companion to Secession, Routledge
2011 or John Wood, “Secession: A Comparative Analytical Framework” in Canadian Journal of Political Science,
1981.
22
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from states with secessionist movements. Through this analysis a model of secession will be
advanced which might have predictive capacities. Throughout, I will illustrate my arguments by
recounting my own experience in Europe researching UKexit23 and Catalonia.

What Causes Secession?
All over the world, irrespective of governmental system, the natural wealth of a territory, or
the language(s) spoken in particular places, proposed and actual secession is relatively familiar.
There are, however, few satisfying works to describe its causes, perhaps because of its ubiquity.
With such range in geography, political economy, and cultural norms, how can this phenomenon
be attributed to anything other than a general dissatisfaction with the ruling regime and the union
it cements?
This piece posits that any secession begins as the function of three phenomena at the mass
level: status concerns, the perceived viability of the potential secessionist polity, and material
concerns. A secession movement, whether peaceful and referendum-based, as with the United
Kingdom’s exit from the European Union, or violent and subject to shifting events, as in South
Sudan’s drive for independence, begins with the same incipient characteristics. Because this
theory presupposes a referendum for independence, the voters’ ballots are what matter. To that
end, it is critical to make the distinction that what matters is not the actual circumstances of
status concerns or the economic situation, but rather how the voters perceive these situations.
This distinction seems facially difficult to reconcile with the objective characteristics of any
situation. However, as will be shown in the Regression Analysis Section, delineating fact from
opinion makes it easier to develop practical applications such as predictive modeling, because it
needs account only for the opinions of the voters, which can be achieved by polling. This is
considerably easier than charting regional versus union economic performance or analyzing
registries of laws to find those which generate regional security concerns or court decisions
minimizing or banning regionally significant cultural practices. While each variable will be
covered more comprehensively in their own sections later in this paper, they are defined briefly
in the following paragraphs.
Status concerns exist where the people of a region perceive their territory, themselves, or
their culture (whether racial, ethnic, or religious) to be threatened by being within a union. The
center of the union may threaten the region by force or with policies and/or processes whether
they are legal, extra-legal, or illegal. Critically, however, the threat producing a status concern
must originate externally to the potentially secessionist region. For example, the central state
supreme court may in a hypothetical country rule that a religion – which is the majority religion
inside a region, but the minority religion in the state overall – does not warrant special
consideration in the workplace, thereby generating a status concern. By contrast, a regional court
ruling – critically, comprised of citizens from the region itself and not appointed externally by
the center – holding the same would not generate a status concern even if unpopular, because the
decision would have come from within the region.
23

I refer here to the projected withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, accepting the argument
that UKEXIT rather than BREXIT is the correct abbreviation (O’Leary, 2016).
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Material concerns are those which manifest in a population through thinking that their region
will be economically, financially, or productively worse off by staying in its union. The crucial
point in defining material concerns is that it is not a calculation of whether it is materially better
to be independent or to stay within the union. It is instead a metric of whether the population feel
they are being economically taken advantage of by remaining inside the union.
In contrast to status and material concerns, which focus on perceived negative actions from
the center or circumstances arising from being part of a union, viability concerns are those
doubts that citizens in a potentially secessionist region have regarding the viability of the region
as an independent state outside the union. Viability concerns may be geopolitical (“I feel my
region would not survive independently because we would be attacked and overrun”), internally
political (“I feel my region would not survive independently because we are so evenly split
between hardliner unionists and hardliner separatists”), or economic (“I feel my region would not
survive independently because we would not be economically self-sufficient”).
While every successful secession begins with these commonalities, not every movement
exhibiting them will be successful. The campaign’s success is conditional on a number of
factors, both exogenous and endogenous, including the response of the central state (whether
conciliatory or repressive) and the organization of the secessionist movement. The exact criteria
for successful secessions are covered in detail in many other great works and are not the topic of
this paper.

Status Concerns, in the context of secession
A prerequisite of secession is a separable territory occupied by a people who are in some
way distinctive from the remainder of the whole, or a distinct part of a whole as when a union
includes multiple parts. A status concern exists where that territory or its people in some way are
threatened or perceive themselves to be threatened by force, policies, or processes external to
that territory. In this situation, a portion of a state entity or union perceives that they are being
treated as inferior to another segment of the population. This frequently manifests itself as a
feeling of being second-class citizens.
Status concerns cover a wide range of de facto and de jure configurations. At times,
status concerns are the result of general circumstances. For example, colonialism necessarily
subordinates the native population of the colonized territory to the colonizing population. At
other times, the concerns arise as a result of distinct government actions which reduce status,
such as the Indian presidential decree of 5 August 2019 which revoked Kashmir’s special status,
reducing its autonomy and eliminating section 370’s protective wording in the Indian
constitution, sparking protests. Between 5 August and 15 September, there were more than 700
protests at this decree, and political leaders in Kashmir called for unification with Pakistan.24
Critically, these status concerns are not easily separated into categories. They may
include instances of no or inadequate regional or self-government, diluted representation in the
central government, colonialism, cultural or ethnic slights or aggressions (such as refusal to
recognize a language or denial of religious rites). Nevertheless, as this paper will later
Al Jazeera, “India revokes Kashmir’s special status”, 4 September 2019. Available at
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/india-revokes-kashmir-special-status-190904143838166.html
24
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demonstrate, although the form status concerns take are impossible to predict in advance, they
are simple to locate and to measure in intensity.
It will be repeated throughout this paper but bears advance emphasis here that the
strength of this form of modeling is its versatility. Although in-depth analysis of specific cases
undoubtedly is fruitful to crafting responses and to understanding the situation, the broadness of
definition of status concern here contributes to the robustness of the model. A population
sufficiently aggrieved to mobilize into independentist movements may have multiple grievances
with the central state. As a result, this theory dictates that generalized polling, for example on
overall feeling about the central government, is more useful in capturing public sentiment than
asking specific questions on, for example, land expropriation or language laws. Issue-specific
polling will not work as effectively in most cases because not all of the population will have the
same grievance. By asking generally about status concerns, all of the population will be able to
report a grievance by virtue of the inclusive nature of the questioning.
As a result, polling status concerns is surprisingly easy, because when status concerns are
of sufficient magnitude to warrant secessionism they will appear as responses indicating
favorability toward sovereignty. This might at first seem logically distant, however, it is merely
the predictable result of any grievance against the state which has not been rectified. The
aggrieved population will undoubtedly believe that their independent government would do a
better job in addressing whatever issue(s) has constituted their status concern. Take, for example,
the instance of UKexit. Extensive research and polling,25 has indicated that concerns about EUcontrolled migration, the unelected Commission, and EU-made laws generally were the primary
source of mobilization for those who voted to leave the EU. As a result, 78% of the 12,369
individuals polled who voted to leave said they thought that the UK’s ability to control their own
laws would be improved if they were to leave the EU.26

Material Concerns, in the context of secession
Material concerns, simply, are the belief by the people of a region that being or remaining
part of a union will be economically, financially, or productively bad for that region. Critically, it
is not a calculation of whether the region is better inside or outside of the union, but rather a
question of whether the region perceives itself to be taken advantage of by remaining inside of
the union. That is, even if a seceding part will be predictably qualitatively and/or quantitatively
worse off outside of a union, material concerns may manifest if that part perceives itself to be
unfairly taxed, for example.
Material concerns may take the form of disparate or targeted financial regulations or
taxes, as for example, was the case for Singapore in the Federation of Malaysia or what
autonomists/secessionists say is the case today in Catalonia in Spain. They may also take the
form of trade policy dilution as happened in Norway in its 19th century union with Sweden.
Similarly to status concerns, a broad range of issues may constitute a material concern.
Nevertheless, there is a common theme among them. Merely a poor economy overall will not
25

See, e.g. any of the numerous polls from Lord Aschroft Polling and Brexit and British Politics by Geoff Evans
and Anand Menon, 2017.
26
Ashcroft Polling, Exit Polls, 23 June 2016.
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trigger material concerns. That is, if a downturn in the global or regional economy occurs, the
potential secessionist entity will not immediately desire secession. As will be discussed in its
own section, this occurred in Catalonia in Spain. Although a depressed economy contributed to
household income loss in Catalonia, it was not perceived to be the fault of the Spanish central
state, and so did not stoke secessionist sentiment in itself. Indeed, material concerns must in
some way originate from the central government and either impinge on the secessionist part or
advantage the rest of the state without doing so for the secessionist part.

Viability Concerns, in the context of secession
Viability concerns are separate and distinct from both status and material concerns. While the
latter two concerns focus on some imposition, perceived or actual, of the central state onto the
potential seceding entity, viability in this context is predicated on whether a newly independent
state could survive without its rump state. These viability concerns may be economic or
geopolitical in nature.
Thus, it is possible to have material concerns but consider oneself to be economically
unviable as a separate entity. For instance, a voter in a city might greatly dislike an extra tax
imposed on her from the central state but would also consider her city to be economically
unviable as a state. In this instance, it is possible to have both a material concern but internally
reject it as a rationale for secession due to a perception of unviability as an independent state. It
is also possible to have status concerns but consider oneself to be politically unviable as a
separate entity. For example, during an interview I conducted with a Deputy of the Spanish
Congress,27 she raised the valid point that an independent Catalonia would be politically unviable
due to the large proportion of residents there who desire to remain a part of Spain. In this
instance, it is possible to have a status concern but subordinate it to doubts about geopolitical
viability. In this case it may happen that sovereigntists shift their frame of expectations to
compromise and adopt less extreme demands, such as increased autonomy inside of the central
state.
For the purposes of this work, what matters is the perception of the potential seceding state’s
viability. Rather than debating the validity and comprehensiveness for a metric of real levels of
geopolitical or economic viability, it matters only how the population perceives those levels,
which can be shown, e.g., through a poll asking citizens inside of the potential seceding entity
how their territory might fare as an independent state, or, even more on the nose, the binary
question of whether the seceding entity would be viable.

Overview of the variables
The preceding parts of this paper have elaborated three primary and common variables
found in secessionist sentiment. While the following sections will apply all three variables to

27

8 Jul 2019.
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real-world case studies and conduct statistical analysis of them, this section will tie together the
variables into a more cohesive formulation.
One of the most interesting implications of this framework is that because of the
interrelationship of all three variables, voters may internally reject or subordinate some
considerable concerns because of the absence of another. For example, as already mentioned
briefly in the preceding section, perceived unviability as an independent state may be enough to
weaken outright preferences for secessionism due to status or material concerns.
It may also be possible that good economic circumstances inside of a union effectively
smother status concerns, especially if overall economic prosperity is perceived as being delivered
by the union. For example, if entering into a new trading bloc (the EU, for instance), was
perceived to increase investment, immigration, and travel, thereby spurring growth in the central
state but also in the potentially-secessionist region, this mutually, economically beneficial
relationship might assuage secessionist sentiment within the region.28 Another example of status
subordination to outstanding economic circumstances might come as a decrease in the region’s
share of the union debt or as an extra remuneration from the center to a secessionist region – in
essence, buying the perpetuation of the union. This happened, for instance, in the case of the
rebate from the European Union to the United Kingdom secured by Margaret Thatcher.
Thus far these variables have been treated approximately equally, however, another
interesting facet of this framework is that they may not weigh equally in the voters’ calculi.
Indeed, as regression analysis and case study examples will show, status concerns seem to be the
overriding feature of secessionism. In the case of Quebec, the inability to produce a status
concern with federal Canada in addition to taxation as a material concern quite probably was
responsible for the defeat of both the 1980 and 1995 referenda (see Table 2 for example). And, in
the case of UKexit, the vast majority of Leavers listed status-related aspects as the main rationale
for their vote rather than economic arguments. Conversely, Remainers tended to rely on
economic arguments to show the benefit of remaining and the detriment of leaving (see Table 1).

One might make the case that Scotland has remained in the UK in large part because it ensured access to the EU’s
single market and customs union. This is evident in the language used by many of the politicians in Scotland who
are not fond of the UK but have tolerated it.
28
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Table 1. Whether voted to Leave/Remain vs single biggest reason for doing so
Decision
Leave
Remain

% Listing Status* Rationales
95%
0%

% Listing Economic** Rationales
5%
74%

Source of data: Lord Ashcroft Polls
* Single biggest reason was “the principle that decisions about the UK should be taken in the UK”, “offered the best
chance for the UK to regain control over immigration and its own borders”, or because the UK would have no
choice “about how the EU expanded its membership or its powers in the years ahead”. No one listed as their single
biggest reason to remain in the EU that they wanted to have decision-making shared with the EU.
** Single biggest reason was “the risks of voting to leave the EU looked too great when it came to things like the
economy, jobs and prices” or access to the EU single market.

Finally, it must be repeated that the actual circumstances of status, material, and viability
must be divorced from their perceptions by voters. In a sufficiently misinformed or uninformed
population, it matters indeed very little whether union actually helps or hurts compared to the
counterfactual of life in accomplished independence. As will be shown, economic arguments
both for Catalan secessionists and for Leavers from the UK were specious at best. Because
independence referenda do not factor in coefficients for GDP per capita or indices of centralstate reach, only the votes cast impact the outcome. As a result, the only factors bearing on the
referendum result are the voters’ perceptions of the issues. This is both dangerous as it may lead
to unfortunate outcomes which have long-lasting and frequently unintended ramifications, but it
is also convenient for political scientists because instead of collating economic figures,
geopolitical viability measures, and comparing regional versus central state legal systems and
legislation, one need only poll a representative sample of voters in the region in which the
referendum will be administered in order to gauge the outcome.
One potential weakness of this framework, however, is that these outcomes cannot be
predicted far in advance. Because these concerns often change over the course of a referendum
campaign, the numbers taken at the outset of the announcement of a referendum will not always
square with what voters are thinking in the polling booths. Nevertheless, examining the measures
of status, material and viability concerns may perhaps reduce the numbers of “I don’t know”
respondents in the traditional “How will you vote?” polls which have tended to be inaccurate in
the past. This is because most voters will be able to more readily respond to questions asking
them about their feelings than about grave political matters. As a result, polls will garner more
accurate results by asking for opinions on the matters of central state intrusion and their own
economic situations than by asking for a yes or no on the life-altering prospect of the status of
their union.
In the following sections I will make use of four case studies to demonstrate examples, both
historical and modern, of status, material, and viability concerns. These studies – NorwaySweden, the United Kingdom in the European Union, Quebec in Canada, and Catalonia in Spain
– were chosen because they meet key criteria. First, two of the four cases, Norway-Sweden and
the UK, yielded successful secession while the remaining two, Quebec and Catalonia, have not
yet done so to date. Second, in three cases, the UK, Quebec, and Catalonia, there is ample
opinion polling data on voters’ attitudes about status, material, and viability concerns. These
three case studies will also be used in my regression analysis section. Unfortunately, Norway has
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no such polling data available because of the early date the union dissolution was effectuated
(1905). Nevertheless, there is ample historical accounting, both in books from the period and
from newspaper stories, as well as economic and legislative data which allows me to extrapolate
trends and demonstrate clear instances of status, material, and viability concerns.

Case Study 1. The Union of Norway-Sweden
As far back as the 1814 union between Norway and Sweden and their 1905 decision to
dissolve that union, patterns of status, material and viability concerns are found. Although these
trends must be demonstrated with historical exegesis in place of polling data, they are
nonetheless visible. In-depth analysis shows that these trends are as plainly obvious in looking
back at the early 20th century as they are in looking back to the 2016-2020 (projected) UKexit
process.
Although the Norwegian King formally abdicated his role in 1814, the true date of union
between Norway and Sweden was 6 August 1815 on which the Rigsakt (Act of Union) was
signed.29 The Norwegians clearly had always considered the Union to be in name only while
retaining their sovereignty. The Norwegian addition to the Swedish King’s address to his
Parliament called for the “complete equality . . . of the two peoples” to avoid “subjugation” of
one by the other.30 There was always, however, a calculation by the Swedish crown that once the
union was established concessions might be reneged upon and centrality accomplished under the
Swedish throne. Evidence of this is available as early as a letter written by Swedish King Carl
Johan, in which he expressed his desire to end the “Norwegian matter”31 as quickly as possible
by granting some concessions which could simply be revoked at a later date.32
The Union united Norway and Sweden under the Swedish Crown held by Carl Johan.
Formally, this arrangement was intended to be a monarchical union, but not a parliamentary one.
It allowed the independence of both states’ legislatures and the maintenance of their laws and
governments.33 Nevertheless, the Rigsakt vested in the Crown the sole right of calling up both
nations’ troops, declaring war and concluding peace, and, critically, of all foreign policy
including entering into and leaving treaties and appointing ambassadors.34 As a result, although
both nations were ostensibly equal in their union, to all outside observers it was the Swedish
which were the dominant partner because their King handled all external interactions and was
vested with the right of war and military action. Put simply, the Crown – perceived as Swedish –
monopolized external relations and security.
Still, after the initial shock of union with Sweden, a relative quiescence prevailed in Norway.
Indeed, a new wave of “Scandinanvianism” circulated throughout the middle part of the
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nineteenth century.35 However, this goodwill was not to last and began to give way to separatist
tendencies beginning in the latter half of the 1860s.36 Popular newspapers at the time reported the
Norwegian population were newly occupied with status concerns, asserting that Sweden was a
tyrannical menace to Norway or claiming that Norway must seek to leave the union in order to
improve.37 Concerns of Swedish dominance were not without merit. Not only was Sweden
economically and militarily superior to Norway on paper, primary source documentation from
Swedish citizens shows full awareness of this superiority.38 Rather than embracing the spirit of
ostensible equality the union was intended to entail, it seems the Swedes and Norwegians were
completely cognizant of the unequal roles each had in the union.
While feelings of general discontent continued to swirl throughout the 1860s, the impulse to
dismantle the union politically ultimately came largely from the Norwegian Venstre party over
the issue of foreign representation in consular offices. Popular politicians, including the victor of
the 1884 election for Norwegian Prime Minister, gave rousing speeches against Sweden,
charging that unionism was an existential threat to Norway.39 In the beginning, sovereigntists
demanded fundamental change to the structure of the union to prevent the subordination of
Norway’s goals to Sweden’s. As I will show, the refusal of Sweden to make the concessions
ultimately produced very real status concerns which galvanized the outright independence
movements.
Status concerns, here emblematized by the conviction that Sweden thought itself the senior
partner in the union and affronts caused by the unilateral Swedish representation of the union,
were well documented at the time. On their face, these concerns might seem quite small, but in
fact they are so basic to distinctiveness that to a sufficiently salient national identity they are
necessities. Take for example Catalonia, which maintains foreign representation separate from
Spain40 and regularly jostles for status with the central state government.
Tendering their resignations to the King, Norwegian ministers resigned out of “loyalty to
their mother country”.41 Meanwhile, prominent Norwegians continued to give speeches
disparaging the union’s effects on Norway. One such speaker ended his diatribe with “Norway
first and last”, while another claimed that Norway had the original culture of Scandinavia.42 This
latter speech further compounded calls for the reification of the Norwegian identity in a union
dominated by Sweden.43
Still, these arguments lacked external credibility without a precise metric to which
secessionists could advert. Though they continued to vocally disparage the joint system of
foreign affairs, which was predominantly directed by Swedish officials, and which, they argued,
unfairly advantaged Sweden to the detriment of Norway, secessionists needed a new argument.
The crux of the popular stance became that an independent Norway could negotiate its own trade
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agreements, thereby tailoring them to Norwegian needs. Thus, anti-unionists in Norway began to
use the idea that the union was negatively impacting their nation economically as a method by
which they might show that the argument for independence was not merely viscerally oriented
but had a quantifiable rationale.
Noted Scandinavian scholar Raymond Lindgren rejects the veracity this argument by
pointing out that it was in fact a status concern held by the Norwegian public, rather than any
measurable disadvantage that drove secessionist sentiment:
In reality, however, these arguments served only to prove a case of suppression of
Norwegian political liberties. In their own eyes, they were capable of and possessed the right
to foreign representation as one independent country in a union postulated on the merger of
two sovereign states.44
Moreover, an economic argument for dissolving the Norwegian-Swedish union lacks
objective credibility. Not only was the Norwegian economy stronger as a result of the union with
Sweden, but it actually declined and plateaued following the dissolution of the union. Indeed,
there were never any serious economic tensions between Norway and Sweden until the late
1860s, and one would be hard pressed to find any way of looking at the economic outputs of the
time to find that Norway was in any way disadvantaged or economically curtailed by the union.
Labor productivity in the 19th century prior to the dissolution of the union in 1905 increased
markedly, while labor productivity growth rates were far lower after the split.45 Additionally, the
period immediately following its independence, from 1900 to 1914, was relatively stagnant for
GDP growth in Norway, and only improved nearly two decades later because of a second
industrial revolution.46
The point of highlighting this economic data is not to suggest that secession is bad. It serves
merely to show that economic arguments in favor of secession lack objectivity, and, as a result,
usually accuracy as well. Interestingly, although Norway did quite well after its secession, it did
so not through negotiating trade deals, as was promised by the anti-unionists, but by
industrializing its internal economy in place of a prior agrarian model. In 1905, few Norwegians
could have foreseen that their economy would improve in this manner.
Norway’s economic turnaround shows that a constituent part which secedes from the whole
is not doomed to economic privation, but that it must work quite diligently to overcome the
obvious disadvantages in severing an economy from a greater part. Had Norway not restructured
its economy it would not have fared as well, because it had previously relied on the quasiinternal market of Sweden as a receptacle for its main export, agriproducts.
In 1903 Norway began to experience a dramatic restructuring of geopolitical influence within
its union. This was effectively an equating force in the balance between the two nations as
Norway became militarily and diplomatically comparable to Sweden. Two primary causes
produced this equilibrating effect. First, Norway’s military approached (and perhaps even
surpassed) the capacity of the Swedish military, originally used so effectively to force the union
in the first place. Second, the Norwegian foreign diplomatic presence and involvement on the
continent grew to resemble the level of Sweden’s. After this geopolitical rebalancing,
44
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Norwegians doubtless felt that they could do at least as well as Sweden if they dissolved the
union, and it may even have smothered any popular sentiment in Norway that the economy had
improved as a result of the union.

Case Study 2. The United Kingdom in the European Union
The United Kingdom, despite having been twice denied accession to the European Union by
Charles De Gaulle, had held a privileged spot within the EU. Most famously, Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher secured a rebate for the UK’s contribution to the Common Agricultural
Policy. This rebate in 2014 was more than €6 billion, reducing the contribution of the United
Kingdom to the European Union’s budget by fully 35%.47 Another quirk of the unique British
rebate was that any modification to it required British consent. The number as well as the sheer
magnitude of the special treatments lent to the British through this rebate leaves little doubt as to
why the French have called it “le chéque britannique” or the British check. Clearly, this is meant
to be derogatory and conjure images of paying the British for promises of their good behavior.
One other famous example of British “special status” within the EU was the opt-out from the
euro, the common currency of the Eurozone. What makes it such a remarkable exemption is then
-Prime Minister John Major’s insistence on and success in having it included in the Maastricht
Treaty, the major document which transformed the European Community into the European
Union. Indeed, of the 8 remaining member states of the EU who do not officially use the euro, all
but Denmark are obligated to join the eurozone when their economies are deemed to be
sufficiently convergent and stable to do so. The UK also has key opt-outs in the Schengen Zone,
which allowed the United Kingdom to maintain its borders even with other EU member states.
The UK also secured an explicit opt-out of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in Protocol 30
to the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union, joining only Poland in an arrangement
that makes clear that the Charter does not “create justiciable rights . . . except in so far as Poland
or the United Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national law.”48 This is by no means an
exhaustive list of the UK’s negotiated opt-outs.
This special status notwithstanding, however, the representation of the United Kingdom
inside the European Union was proportionally the same as any other member state. That is, the
number of members the UK sent to the European Parliament was proportionally equal to its
share of the total EU population, and, like all member states, the UK had representation in the
form of 1 judge on the Court of Justice, 2 judges on the General Court, 1 Commissioner in the
College of the European Commission, and 1 member (the Prime Minister) on the European
Council. As a member of the EU, the UK could unilaterally veto any proposal relating to
taxation, new treaties, the accession of new states to the Union, most foreign policy proposals,
and EU-wide defense resolutions. Moreover, the UK had the third largest population in the EU,
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making up just shy of 13% of the total EU population by itself.49 As a result, the UK held an
outsized role in qualified majority voting, the method by which most decisions are made in the
European Council. For proposals made from the Commission, ratification of decisions required
at least 16 of the 28 member states to agree AND countries representing at least 65% of the total
population in the EU. This meant that of the 36% that could veto a proposal, the UK alone
accounted for 36% of the required no vote. No objective outside observer would remark that this
arrangement was unfair for the UK.
Nevertheless, the United Kingdom’s status concerns motivating the decision to exit the
European Union were obvious. First, the UK existed before the European Union, and was
comprised mostly of people who, according to polling, considered themselves to be far more
British than European. The majority of those who voted to leave in the 2016 referendum
appeared to have believed that the EU threatened some national interest or otherwise limited the
potential of the United Kingdom in some way.50 The UK had established state institutions, a
discrete and separable territory ready for secession, a people distinctive from the whole of the
European Union, and, for some of its citizens, common interests which were both salient and
perceived to be impacted negatively through union.
It is clear, not only from interviewing British politicians who supported Leave in the 2016
referendum on leaving the EU and from speaking informally to British citizens who also voted
this way, but also from polling data that the primary motivator for their decision was that the UK
should restore full control its own law-making. Lord Ashcroft’s poll on the day of the
referendum found that 49% of those who voted to leave did so because they believe in “the
principle that decisions about the UK should be taken in the UK”. A further 33% said that they
did so because they felt that leaving “offered the best chance for the UK to regain control over
immigration and its own borders”.51 Just 5% cited the economy as their reason for leaving.52
Indeed, it seems that the economy in this instance was far more important to those who voted
Remain: 43% said that they voted to remain because “the risks of voting to leave the EU looked
too great when it came to things like the economy, jobs, and prices”, while 31% voted to remain
to retain access to the single market.53 Every single politician from Northern Ireland whom I
interviewed in 2018, including both the Democratic Unionists and the Ulster Unionists,
mentioned their worries over the economic trouble projected to result from the decision to leave.
Northern Ireland voted to remain by 56% to 44%.
Expressing dissatisfaction with how the negotiations had been conducted one Ulster Unionist
MLA said, “if they’d have sorted out the trade relationships with the UK and the EU as a whole,
the border issue in Ireland and Northern Ireland wouldn’t be as complicated.”54 His point, as I
take it, was that had the negotiators focused on how trade would operate post-UKexit, border
reconciliation may have followed logically. This reaction illustrates the dichotomy between a
unionist who must support the union’s central government in Westminster and someone distant
from the main leave sentiment focused on status. Instead of the rhetoric of someone who
49
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instigated an independence movement for status reasons, we see a rational mind focused on best
navigating the decision of the union.
Most Ulster Unionist leaders now support leaving the European Union (although the UUP
had advocated voting remain before the referendum). They do so not with the same zeal that an
English Leaver might, but with the grudging acceptance of someone who has weighed the costs
of remaining in each union – the UK and the EU – and accepted that the lesser of two evils is to
remain with the number one trading partner, rather than the number two trading partner.
Among the British politicians whom I interviewed, the representatives from parties whose
official platforms were to Remain, as well as those members of the Conservative and Labour
parties who voted Remain, also mentioned the economy, while those who voted to leave or who
were part of the government coalition (including DUP MPs in Westminster) mentioned their
concerns over status. Both sets of officials did so without being prompted directly to give a
reason for their decision – which is to say, their views on the subject followed as a result of
discussing exiting the EU more broadly.
For example, a Conservative Party policy advisor who voted Leave, discussed only issues
relating to status. “It’s not enough,” I was told, “[that the UK receives an equal voice in the
Council or that there are 73 UK MEPs because there were] around 650 more MEPs [who weren’t
from the UK, and who could influence the direction of European Union policy, and so affect
policy in the UK as well]”.55 This outlook represented no interest in the proportionality of
representation, but rather concern about any division of decision-making power. When status
concerns are so deeply ingrained as to oppose the fundamental concept of division of
competences, they are unmanageable by standard concession tactics in negotiations. If this type
of thinking becomes prevalent in an indifferent or already hostile population, it results in an
uncompromising inclination to exit the union.
Critically, material concerns need not be rooted in fact; they must merely be perceived.
According to one Liberal Democrat MP, there was “no logical economic basis” for voting Leave
and the arguments for leaving “don’t bear up to scrutiny.”56 The same MP also expressed
concern at the eventual economic impacts of Brexit, mentioning that one of the most damaging
effects could already be seen as EU businesses plan alternate routes to avoid the English port of
Dover.
Take, for example, the now-infamous red bus which during the 2016 UKexit referendum
promised to send to the National Health Service the £350 million/week the UK contributes to the
EU budget. That figure never accounted for the £4 billion annual rebate that Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher secured for the UK. The revised figure should have been in the area of £250
million/week, nearly 29% less than what was originally reported. If one accounts for the UK’s
commitment to remain in some EU programs post-UKexit (Erasmus+, the Shared Prosperity
Fund, etc.) and the UK’s commitment to replace fully the EU’s farming subsidies with a
domestic equivalent, then the number falls to £57 million/week. Conservatively, that amounts to
just 16% of what was promised, demonstrating how specious such claims were. This calculation
does not take into account the divorce bill owed to the EU by the UK for its outstanding debts for
ongoing EU projects, which is currently estimated at €40 billion. Given the impact of the quality
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of the data presented on referendums and the relatively short deliberative period in the leadup to
the campaign, it follows that such poorly contrived figures may well have driven the debate.57
The revised figure above is only the most basic accounting. In-depth analysis of the overall
economic impact by the Treasury puts fifteen-year projections for the British economy at a loss
of more than £250 billion if no post-withdrawal trade deal is achieved with the EU. The best case
economic scenario, remaining in the Single Market and the Customs Union, would still
negatively impact the economy to the effect of £52 billion, likely because of discrepancies in, for
example, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, which would have to be checked before goods
from the UK enter EU territory.58
Within this theory’s framework, therefore, the UK was perhaps a perfect contender for
secession. The UK has a long and proud history, both military and diplomatic, in Europe and
beyond. In 2016, according to the European Commission, by itself, the United Kingdom
comprised fully 16% of the EU’s economy as measured by GDP, second only to Germany.
Perhaps those in the United Kingdom who voted to leave the European Union felt that they were
such an integral part of the Union that they were comfortable leaving, expecting to have partially
hobbled the European Union and trusting that they would be able to cope on their own as they
had done before 1973.
For the UK, the same type of economic restructuring as had occurred in Norway is currently
difficult to envision. Its financial services sector is already necessarily heavily integrated in the
EU and so relies on the Union for quite a lot of its market. One LSE study predicted the loss of
60,000 jobs in the City of London alone.59 According to the OECD, Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) has plummeted by more than 92% between 2016 and 2017 to the lowest levels since
2005.60 European Union scholar J.J. Welfens draws a connection between FDI and inflow of
technological innovation, leading to potential difficulties for the UK in remaining competitive in
the global market.61
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Canada is a federation consisting of three territories and ten provinces, of which Quebec is
one. Francophones comprise more than 75% of the population in the province of Quebec.62
Canada’s Constitution grants explicit equality both to English and to French, requires
government offices to communicate with citizens in either language, and grants the right to
citizens and officials to use either language in the federal Parliament and courts. The
Constitution also grants citizens the right to have their children taught in English or French if that
is the parents’ first language, even if they reside in an area for which that language is the
minority. Although most of Canada operates on common law, Quebec is unique in its operating
on a civil law tradition which is modelled on French Napoleonic Code.63 Since 1875, the
Supreme Court of Canada has been required to consist of at least three judges from Quebec; the
other judicial appointments are governed only by tradition so long as they live inside 40km of the
National Capital Region,64 a federal designation which includes Ottawa, the national capital of
Canada, and Gatineau, the fourth largest city in Quebec. By tradition, the Canadian executive
Cabinet represents the whole of Canada by selecting at least one minister from each province,
including Quebec. Constitutionally, representation in the Canadian Parliament is fixed, and so
Quebec has historically been more than proportionally represented for its population in the
federal legislature. A provision in the Canadian Constitution grants each province authority over
its own natural resources, including development, conservation, and taxation thereof.65
Moreover, a system of opt-outs is inbuilt by a 1965 statute, which Quebec shepherded through
the Canadian Parliament so they could opt out of proposed government programs.66 The opt-out
is now enshrined in the 1982 Canadian Constitution.67 To maintain a level of civility, the
Canadian government offers opt-outs to all provinces, but historically Quebec has been the only
province to opt-out of federal programs.68 At least by the letter of the law, it would be very
difficult indeed to locate a grievance serious enough to amount to a real status concern.
The opposite of the economic veneer veiling status concerns seen in UKExit is found in the
very genuine material concerns of Quebec’s 1980 secessionist movement. In a book on the
subject, Anne Griffin interviewed numerous citizens of Quebec.69 Very few mentioned that they
had any qualms with the federal Canadian government’s decision making, even on behalf of
Quebec. Instead, each of them took issue with what they felt was damaging and unfair taxation.
No discernible status concern existed behind which to rally, and so this secessionist movement
was unable to produce the same degree of mobilization success as that which emerged in the runup to the 1995 referendum.
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As I will demonstrate both textually and with polling data, no status concern existed in
Quebec of sufficient magnitude to mobilize the population to secession. Indeed, Quebec in the
early 1980s had concerns which chiefly involved taxation. This case is further reinforced by
Griffin’s book. As one of Griffin’s interviewees, a boisterous member of the Parti Quebecois
who had twice stood for political office, mentioned, Quebec’s economy could only be robust if it
attained independence from Canada.70 He stated, “we must be given our own governmental
structures, and then . . . when we have acquired them . . . then we’ll begin to do business.”71
Several other respondents mentioned taxes and economic policy, but only one of them ever
mentioned status issues. Thus, the majority of respondents mentioned the economy as their main
reason for supporting secession or separatism, either directly by mentioning taxation or some
related economic issue or indirectly by expressing their desire to reform or limit the central
Canadian government’s hold on Quebec for the purpose of reducing limitations on business and
enterprise.
Tellingly, the one government official Griffin interviewed who did mention political and
status aspects of the independence movement did so only in an attempt to leverage it as an issue
into negotiations with the Canadian central government on healthcare reform.72 This official
wanted to take relatively benign status concerns where they existed and use them to negotiate
with Ottawa. This ulterior motive is a bargaining chip for concessions from the center rather than
a bonified status concern. It would not be enough to mobilize secessionist sentiment.
The failed 1980 Canadian independence referendum is indicative of the fate to which
secessionist movements which lack a strong sense of status concerns are confined. The populace
may be disgruntled by economic disparities and taxation policies, but those are matters for
reform and negotiation – they are never immediately the precipitant for independence. Possibly,
however, a central government which refuses to negotiate with an independence movement (or,
more realistically, a political party which backs independence) may provoke the conditions
which constitute a status concern.
The second independence referendum of October 1995 came far nearer to a majority in favor
of secession than did its predecessor in 1980, largely because of the initial emphasis on status
that the secessionists introduced to the debate, especially as regards drafting the Canadian
Constitution without Quebec’s consent. Still, once the federalists turned the argument back to the
economy, the secessionists were obliged to follow suit and support for secession subsequently
began to drop.73 Exemplary of this phenomenon is Lucien Bouchard’s speech on 25 October, just
five days before the referendum, in which he mentions status items in only a cursory manner and
attributes it to the No side (that is, those who would vote no to an independent Quebec), and
devotes the remainder of the speech to discussing economic and monetary union with Canada
and debt and jobs in Quebec (Bouchard, 1995).74
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Further corroboration of this trend can be found in Robert Young’s The Secession of Quebec
and the Future of Canada and Maurice Pinard’s aggregate data set of polls. Table 2 has a
tabulated representation of key figures. Young reports that at the outset of the referendum on
secession, 44.4% of those polled indicated they would vote yes versus 45.3% who said they vote
no.75 Following a series of gaffes by the federalist side and an admirable job on the part of the
secessionists in framing the debate around a subordinate and aggrieved relationship between
Quebec and Canada, support for leaving Canada grew considerably. One specific gaffe which
enraged sovereigntists was a remark made at a rally for the No side and encouraged No
supporters to “crush [sovereigntists]” at the polls.76 This and other remarks which were so on the
nose that federalist leaders distanced themselves from both the remarks and speakers77 were
likely the nearest thing to genuine status concerns that sovereigntists held, as such statements
minimized and excluded their place in the broader Canadian community. A subsequent poll
placed the percentage of projected Yes voters nearly 5% higher at 49.2% compared to No’s
50.8%.78
Seeing the shift toward support for leaving Canada, the federalist side began to restructure
the debate toward the economy, forcing the secessionists to respond, as I have shown with
Bouchard’s speech as a representative example, and turning the argument away from status
concerns.79 A poll conducted on 24 October,80 just six days before the referendum and one day
before Bouchard’s televised speech, reported a statistical tie. Finally, in a poll conducted by
SOM Research and Surveys between 27 and 29 October (two days after Bouchard’s speech and
one day before the referendum, respectively), fully 25% of respondents indicated either that they
did not know or did not wish to answer when asked how they would vote in the referendum.81
This is indicative of a population which had been forced to reconsider its calculus in the face of
such vastly restructured arguments just days before the referendum. In the end, the referendum
result was incredibly close, reporting 50.2% no and 49.6% yes.

Table 2. Polling data and outcome of the 1995 Quebec Independence referendum
Date

% Yes

% No
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Robert Young, The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press,
1998, p. 276.
76
Young, The Secession of Quebec, 1998, 280.
77
Ibid, 277-84.
78
Ibid.
79
Ibid.
80
Barrett, Edward, “What the polls reveal”, Globe and Mail, 24 October 1995.
81
Pinard’s data, see footnote 55.
75
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17-23 Aug. 1995
14 Oct. 1995
24 Oct. 1995

44.4
49.2
50.2

45.3
50.8
49.8

27-29 Oct. 1995

40.0

35.0

REFERENDUM
(30 Oct. 1995)

49.6

50.2

When the referendum was announced
After the late September speech provoking sovereigntists
Before Bouchard’s ill-fated speech which emphasized economic
rather than status concerns
Inflection point following Bouchard’s speech. 25% did not know
or did not want to respond

Sources of data: Maurice Pinard’s aggregated polling data set
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Case Study 4. Catalonia in Spain
Spain is a federation82 consisting of three tiers of government: the central Spanish
government, the provincial governments, and, of particular interest here, autonomous
communities, including Catalonia. Section 149 of the Spanish Constitution reserves to the central
government many of the competences one would expect any state government to maintain
including defense, customs, monetary matters, international relations, and immigration. Section
148 enumerates the relatively comprehensive powers devolved to the autonomous communities.
As far as I can tell, however, Spain is unique among federations in that Section 147, Clause 2,
Sub-clause d allows prospective autonomous communities to create their own powers of those
not explicitly reserved by the Constitution to the state, and contingent on approval by the Spanish
Parliament. By tradition, autonomous communities may re-draft and re-submit their own
autonomy statutes of the variety previously described by §167, c 2(d).
The latest iteration of the Catalan autonomy statute was approved in 2006, after much
controversy including the Spanish Constitutional Court rewriting 14 articles outright. The
preamble alone contains the word “self-government” four times in just 632 words. Several
words, passages, and articles were re-written or removed by the Spanish Constitutional Court. In
each instance, the stricken text was held to be an explicit arrogation of power or inclusion of
Catalan institutions where the Spanish state held exclusive competence. For example, the first
instance of stricken text appears in Article 6 of the Act. The Court deleted the words “and
preferential” in the sentence “Catalan is the language of normal and preferential use. . ..” because
it obviously conflicted with §3, c 1 of the Spanish Constitution. Other instances of text stricken
for unconstitutionality include several attempts to insert Catalan institutions into processes
already explicitly defined in or reserved to federal legislation by the Spanish Constitution. For
example, the Act attempted to alter the composition of the Council of Justice of Catalonia by
adding the president of the High Court of Justice of Catalonia in addition to the extant
framework created by the federal Organic Act of Judicial Power. Although broadly accepted
today that the Court was within its right to make these emendations by the authority vested in it
by the Constitution, several scholars of the Spanish constitution had thought much of the issue
non-justiciable.83
Certainly, the ruling only added to the tensions between Catalonia and Spain. Before the
Court ruled on the statute on 28 June 2010, the Catalan Centre for Opinion Studies (CEO) found
in a study published on 21 May 2010 that 77.1% of Catalans polled classified the political
situation in Spain as bad or very bad.84 A month after the decision that number grew to 82.9%.85
Just 7.5% of those polled thought the political situation was good or very good.86

82

The field of political science is split over the exact political configuration of Spain. Few, however, deny that it has
many federal elements and that since 1979 it has been on an increasingly federal trajectory. For these purposes, I
will classify it as a federation because of its multiple levels of government which have explicitly enumerated and
reserved powers granted to them by the Constitution.
83
See, e.g., Gervasio Martín Martín, “Sobre las consecuencias jurídicas de la sentencia 31/2010, de 28 de junio, del
tribunal constitucional sobre el estatuto de Cataluña” in Revista de Derecho Político, Madrid, no. 81, 2011.
84
Centre d’Estudis d’Opinio, Barometre d’Opinio Política, 2ª onada 2010, 21 May 2010.
85
Centre d’Estudis d’Opinio, Barometre d’Opinio Política, 3ª onada 2010, 30 July 2010.
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Ibid.
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Clearly Catalan secessionists espouse their own status concerns. The Spanish Constitution of
1978 states that “La Constitución . . . reconoce y garantiza el derecho a la autonomía de las
nacionalidades y regiones que [España] integran . . .”.87 This provision formally established that
there exist historical and even state-legitimate national groups inside of discrete and separable
regions. Whether one reads this provision as a concession by the central state to independentist
groups or as merely recognition of the historical constituent parts of what has become the
Spanish state, it is clear that there are several competing interests and identities at play.
Even inside Catalonia the interests at stake that could constitute a status concern vary
considerably within independence and autonomist groups. For example, one Catalan Parliament
Deputy in the Candidatura d’Unitat Popular (CUP) Party told me it was a matter of the right to
self-determination rather than outright independence.88 That is, Catalans should have the ability
to hold a referendum on their own status, irrespective of the outcome. In contrast to CUP, the
Esquerra Republicana (ERC) Party unabashedly aims for an independent Catalonia, saying
explicitly on its website that the party pursues the “creation of an independent state for the
Catalan nation”.89 Obviously status concerns need not necessarily be held unanimously or with
equivalent intensity among all potential separatist groups. Indeed, it is highly likely that multiple
sovereigntist groups, each desiring varying degrees of autonomy up to and including
independence, will arise in a system deemed sufficiently repressive to warrant an independence
campaign.
The recent history of Catalonia has been one fraught with hostility on the part of both the
Spanish federal government toward the Catalan government and vice versa. Following repressive
drives by the central Spanish state both after the 2009-2012 non-binding referenda and the 2017
referendum which was (intended to be) binding, the desire for an independent Catalan state
increased markedly. When Mariano Rajoy became Prime Minister of Spain in December of
2011, he began a series of hostile actions toward Catalonia. In his first year, his government
failed to make a budget with Catalonia,90 and, famously, in his last year in office before being
ousted by a vote of no-confidence by his own party, Catalonia held its independence referendum
despite strong discouragement from Rajoy’s government. A November 2013 poll found that 52%
of Catalans were in favor of independence,91 a rare absolute majority. Even more surprising, the
same poll found that only 24% of Catalans would vote against independence.92 Nevertheless, just
two years later, 47.9% of Catalans would vote against independence with 43.7% saying they
would vote in favor of independence.93 As with the earlier referenda, the repressive, or
oppressive, responses by the central state dramatically increased the desire for independence.
Again in 2017, the resolute response by the Spanish central state toward both the referendum of
2017 and its organizers naturally exacerbated Catalan status concerns. In the 30 days following
“The Constitution . . . recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions that
comprise Spain. . . “
88
1 Jul 2019.
89
Available in English at https://en.esquerra.cat/en.
90
Per Section 158 (1) of the Spanish Constitution, all autonomous communities must form a fiscal year budget with
the federal legislature. Catalonia’s was the only one not approved by the Government, although it was approved by
the Spanish Parliament. See, e.g, https://www.catalannews.com/politics/item/the-spanish-budget-for-2012-violatesapproved-laws-regarding-investment-in-catalonia
91
La Vanguardia, “Diada: El 52% de los catalanes esta a favor de la independencia”, published 11 September 2013.
92
Ibid.
93
La Vanguardia, “El ‘no’ a la independencia en Catalunya supera al ‘si’ por cuatro puntos”, published May 1 2015.
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the referendum, the number of polled Catalans saying they would vote for independence rose
more than 7 percentage points.94 Despite these occasional spikes in secessionist sentiment, the
overall trend in independence desire has been downward, with just 40.8% in favor a mere four
months after the 2017 referendum.95
In Spain, material concerns have also played a role in secessionist sentiment. Generally,
economic rationales are employed frequently by autonomist and separatist movements. For
example, the ERC manifesto maintains that “The creation of a state is a necessary tool for
maximum economic well-being and social justice for the majority of citizens.” Taxation also
plays a broader role in material concerns. Among secessionists and autonomists, generally, the
prevailing consensus is that Catalans pay an inordinate amount in taxes in comparison with the
other autonomous regions in Spain. The unionist response is best summed up by an interview I
had with a Deputy from Partido Popular, a conservative party.96 They agree that Catalans pay the
highest taxes per capita, but they maintain that this is due in large part because the Catalan
autonomous community government imposes the extra taxes, thereby making them higher than
the countrywide average.
And in Spain, Catalonia has a long history of high degrees of high autonomy, having
existed as a completely independent entity and as the senior partner of the Kingdom of Aragon.
Coupled with the large contribution of Catalonia to the GDP of Spain, it is not difficult to
imagine that some Catalans can envision a successful independent state, particularly one that is
still inside the EU. Indeed, the most recently published annual report from the Centre d’Estudis
d’Opinió shows that in 2017 only 35.2% of respondents considered independence in any way
unviable.97
Although status and material concerns as well as perceived independent viability are all
present in the autonomist and secessionist movements in Catalonia, they are not shared evenly or
with equal intensity throughout the region. The same annual report from the Centre d’Estudis
d’Opinió in 2017 shows that the single largest concern in Catalonia was relations between
Catalonia and Spain, but even this concern constituted less than half the population polled.98
Further, although a majority of Catalans reported that their personal household income had
dropped, they seemed largely to attribute that to the overall economic climate, rather than to
actions by the central Spanish state. Table 3 illustrates the relationship between the general
economic circumstances and Catalan opinion.
Definitionally, this economic outlook does not constitute a material concern per this
theory’s framework, because the concern had not been imposed by the central state onto the
region. Instead it is a fate shared by the whole region due to the overall economic climate from
the preceding “Great Spanish Depression” of 2007-2014. Moreover, a month-by-month polling
analysis shows that Catalans thought the economy was getting better in 2017, as the Spanish
La Vanguardia, “El si a la independencia se impone tras dispararse ocho puntos según el CEO”, published 31
October 2017.
95
La Vanguardia, “El apoyo a la independencia baja al 40,8% y el rechazo sube al 53,9 según el CEO”, published
23 February 2018.
96
5 Jul 2019.
97
Generalitat de Catalunya, Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió Anuari 2017, May 2018. Only 2.8% of respondents explicitly
said that Catalonia was unviable; I have tabulated several concerns which relate in some aspect to viability. See
Appendix A for breakdown.
98
Ibid.
94
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government navigated the economic crisis and the worldwide and European economies simply
improved.99

Table 3. Opinion on the Economic Situation in Catalonia versus actual GDP per capita
Date

% Bad or Very Bad

October 2008
January 2009
November 2009
January 2010
October 2010
January 2011
October 2011
February 2012
October 2012
February 2013
November 2013
March 2014
October 2014
February 2015
October 2015
March 2016
November 2016
March 2017
October 2017

55.9
69.0
66.0
69.4
72.7
75.7
84.6
83.7
86.9
89.0
87.6
78.7
77.6
76.5
66.0
64.2
61.7
53.1
43.1

% Good or Very
Good
19.8
14.7
12.9
13.9
12.0
11.2
6.9
7.9
6.2
4.6
7.8
9.6
11.5
10.9
15.9
16.4
21.8
26.6
41.9

GDP per capita
(thousands of USD)
35.366
32.042
30.502
30.502
28.324
29.059
29.461
25.732
26.505
28.100

Data Sources: Centre d’Estudis D’opinio Anuari 2017 and World Bank “GDP per capita (current US$) – Spain”

This review suggests that Catalonia would almost certainly not vote to become
independent, even in a referendum with appropriate turnout (more than the 40% of the 2017
referendum) and that was sanctioned by the central Spanish state. Later regression analysis will
demonstrate this suggestion. Not only are the constituent sentiments of secessionism a minority
propensity in Catalonia, but those reporting them are split between full independentist
movements and less extreme autonomist ones.

99

Ibid.
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Toward a predictive modeling: regression analysis
If secessionism in popular opinion is indeed based on the three variables I have laid out in
this paper, and if these sentiments can be accurately assessed by opinion polling, then it follows
that regression analysis of these sentiments will reveal a relationship. This type of regression
could even render a model which can be used to predict when a majority Yes vote in an
independence referendum would occur based on opinion polling before the referendum takes
place.
Given the extremely limited sample size of instances of secession which include even
approximately appropriate polling (i.e., that ask opinions on status, material, and viability
concerns), only eight cases are presented here. Nevertheless, they span more than two decades
and occurred in two continents. Six are constituent parts of recognized countries and the
remaining seventh case is of a recognized country from an international confederation (the UK’s
departure from the EU).
The cases are also representative in one other key area: the timeframe in which the data
was taken relative to the timing of a referendum or other provocations. The Canadian case comes
from polling data in 1995 taken before the referendum was announced. This means that no
mainstream political dialogue influenced the respondents. At the other extreme, the UK polling
data was taken as an exit poll of the actual referendum itself, meaning that respondents surely
had the clearest conception in mind of their exact opinions at the time. Happily, the Centre
d’Estudis d’Opinio in Catalonia does regular polling, providing five samples for this study. One
of them, from 2011, provides data from just after the Spanish Constitutional Court rewrote 14
articles of the new Catalan Autonomy Statute. Another, from 2017, was collected the same year
that Catalonia had its independence referendum which was deemed unconstitutional. The other
three cases, from 2012, 2013 and 2014, may be taken as broadly representative of the standard
state of political affairs in Spain and of the kind of relationship that Catalans have with the
Spanish central government. Finally, the Scottish case consists of data collected from 15-17
September 2014 regarding the referendum to take place on 18 September. The Scottish polling,
then, takes place after the debate on independence vs unionism made by political elites and
academics, but before the referendum itself. This makes it highly interesting for predictive
purposes. The results of all cases are tabulated below, and the data used for the model is
provided in Appendix A.
Tables 4-6 provide statistical correlations between the outcome of a referendum (or a
projected referendum in the case of opinion polling-only data) and opinion polls on the three
variables I have described. Status concerns are highly significant, viability slightly less so, and
material concerns are just barely significant. I attribute the latter two decreases in significance to
lack of exactly worded opinion polls. As can be seen in Appendix A, the questions used to
determine viability concerns are unfortunately almost entirely just surrogates, and the questions
used to determine material concerns are usually unable to discern between general economic
concern (in the case of the recession in Spain, for example (and which I do not define as material
concerns)) and concerns which are attributed to a central government negatively impacting a
region (which definitionally are material concerns). Additionally, for material concern polling,
because the questions were not precise enough to delineate blame vs burden, the numbers
particularly for Catalonia will be skewed due to the previously referenced depression in Spain. I
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attribute the low statistical significance to that skewing. As a result, I also provide Table 7 which
shows the relationship between outcome and material concerns without the Catalan cases. It then
returns a highly significant correlation.

Table 4. Regression Analysis of Status Concerns and Independence Vote Outcome
(Intercept)
Status Concerns

Estimate
26.65882
0.46428

Std. Error
4.27297
0.08005

t-value
6.239
5.800
Adj. R2
p-value

Pr(>|t|)
0.000785***
0.001152 **
0.8234
0.001152

Significance: *** 0.001, ** 0.01
Table 5. Regression Analysis of Material Concerns and Independence Vote Outcome
Estimate
(Intercept)
29.7382
Material Concerns 0.4582

Std. Error
9.8533
0.2031

t-value
2.917
2.256
Adj. R2
p-value

Pr(>|t|)
0.0267 *
0.0649 ‣
0.3687
0.06495

Significance: * 0.05, ‣ 0.1
Table 6. Regression Analysis of Viability Concerns and Independence Vote Outcome
Estimate
(Intercept)
24.9075
Viability Concerns 0.4561

Std. Error
7.8864
0.1373

t-value
3.158
3.322
Adj. R2
p-value

Pr(>|t|)
0.0196 *
0.0160 *
0.589
0.01597

Significance: * 0.05

Table 7. Regression Analysis of Material Concerns and Independence Vote Outcome
with Catalan Cases Removed
Estimate
Material Concerns 1.814850

Std. Error
0.004884

Significance: ** 0.01
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t-value
371.6
Adj. R2
p-value

Pr(>|t|)
0.00171 **
1
0.001713

Table 8 shows the numbers used to generate the regressions and the subsequent Figure 1.
This table format is helpful to visualize the overall trends without statistical assistance.

Table 8. Data Input for Regression
Entity

Outcome
(% Yes)

Scotland (2014)*
UK (2016)*
Catalonia (2011)
Catalonia (2012)
Catalonia3 (2013)
Catalonia4 (2014)
Catalonia5 (2017)
Canada (1995)

44.7
52.0
45.4
57.0
54.7
64.2
48.7
35.3

Calc’d. Status
(%)
37.0
55.0
65.3
71.6
70.4
50.6
62.0
32.5

* Denotes an actual referendum which has already occurred.

31

Calc’d. Material
(%)
43.0
47.0
41.8
62.1
60.9
58.5
24.5
37.8

Calc’d. Viability
(%)
53.0
66.0
47.1
70.1
52.5
80.6
35.2
40.0

The results of this regression are presented visually in Figure 1. In the figure each of the
three variables has its own axis, with each case plotted inside the cube. The regression equation
for all three variables is used to generate a plane showing where each case lies in terms of how
high or low its outcome is in a referendum or, in the case of polling-only data, a projected
referendum.

Figure 1. Visual Representation of Regression Equation
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Concluding Remarks and Future Work
In this paper I have utilized historical exegesis, qualitative interviews, and statistical
analysis to track the same three commonalities through centuries of secession and across
continents. I by no means claim that this is the authoritative text on secession, and, indeed, I
intend this paper to be merely preliminary work toward a comprehensive and predictive
modeling. Nevertheless, it seems clear that status, material, and viability concerns are central to
the formation and reification of secessionist sentiment.
Two points above others deserve special re-emphasis. Primarily, for the framework of
this theory, what is important is not the actual attitude or acts from the center toward a region,
nor the objective state of the economy, nor even whether a region would truly be viable as an
independent state. Rather, what is important are the feelings of the public on these matters, or, in
the case of a referendum, the feelings of the voters. Second, it bears further emphasis that
secessionist movements will begin with these sentiments in mind. The success or lack thereof in
any movement is contingent on any number of factors that this framework cannot possibly
include in any comprehensive fashion. In a word, these variables are necessary but not sufficient
for successful independence movements.
Future work has a desperate need in for-purpose polling. The use of surrogate questions
in extant polling has obviously weakened the statistical analysis used in this paper. Even more
regrettable is that in many cases there is no extant polling. New Caledonia held an independence
referendum to determine its status with France in 2018. It was widely expected to return an
overwhelming majority in favor of remaining a part of France. Whether because of a
presupposed blowout or because no one attached enough importance to New Caledonia’s future
to spend the money, no opinion polling information was collected. The result, however, was far
from the overwhelming majority many had expected. Instead, it was 56.4% in favor of remaining
and 43.6% in favor of seceding. New Caledonia is legally entitled to hold another referendum in
September 2020, and for-purpose opinion polls gauging the three concerns I have elaborated here
might allow a glimpse at the result of the referendum before it occurs. Naturally, this type of
polling would have applications both for secessionists and unionists in directing the conversation
and structuring debate.
Because the impacts – economic and political, but also to the day-to-day rhythms of
individuals’ lives – of secession cannot be overstated, it is imperative to understand the origins of
secession. It is crucial to have this understanding both to avert potentially cataclysmic secessions
in instances in which secession will dramatically decrease quality of life or countries’ prospects
for success, and also to manage secessions which are in some way justified, guiding them to a
fruitful telos. While I do not claim this work can do that, I hope it has made some headway into a
formal modeling from which some useful conclusions may be drawn or some important
framework be built.
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Appendix A. Opinion Polling Sources
1. The UK
Source: Lord Ashcroft Polling, Exit Polls, 23 June 2016.
n = 12,369
Outcome: The outcome is from the 2016 referendum on continued membership in the
European Union (52%)
Status: All respondents who responded that “Rights for people in the UK” would
improve outside of the UK (55%)
Material: All respondents who said “the economy as a whole” would be “Better if the
UK leaves the EU” (47%)
Viability: All respondents who believed the “EU needs the UK more” than the UK needs
the EU (66%)
Rationales: All questions were taken from the same base pool of 12,369 respondents.
The status concern question was chosen because if people believe rights for UK citizens
inside the EU are in some way less than they would be if they were not in the union, it
suggests that the EU is in some way diminishing those rights. This creates the belief that
status would be better outside the union than in it.
The material concern question was chosen because if people feel the economy would be
better outside of the union, it suggests that the EU is in some way reducing the UK’s
material opportunities.
The viability concern question is unfortunately a surrogate. Presumably, if these
individuals think the EU needs the UK more than vice versa, they believe the UK is
viable on its own. This is likely a conservative number, as it stands to reason that more
than 66% of British citizens think the UK is viable on its own.

2. Scotland
Source: The Scotsman, Scotland Independence Poll, 12-16 September 2014.
n = 1,175
Outcome: The outcome is from the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence. (55.3%)
Status: All respondents who answered that there would be less inequality in Scotland if
Scotland became an independent country. (37%)
Material: All respondents who said it would be good for Scotland’s economy if Scotland
became an independent country. (43%)
Viability: All respondents who said yes to “Do you agree that Scotland could be a
successful independent country?”
Rationales: All questions were taken from the same base pool of 1,175 respondents. The
status concern question was chosen because those who feel there would be less inequality
in Scotland if, ceteris paribus, Scotland were independent presumably feel that being a
part of the United Kingdom in some way negatively impacts their social status. The
material concern question was chosen because those who feel that Scotland’s economy
would improve – or in the wording of the poll, that it would be good for Scotland’s
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economy – outside of the UK must feel that the UK is putting some limiting factor on
Scotland’s economy. The viability question is a prime example of the kind of question
that should be asked to avoid poor surrogate stand-ins. It is almost literally asking about
the viability of independent Scotland.

3. Quebec
Source: ICPSR, report #3726, “Quebec Sovereignty Referendum Study, 1995”, February
2005.
n = 2177
Outcome: All respondents declaring they were “very favourable” or “somewhat
favourable” to full independence for Quebec.
Status: All respondents who agree with the statement that Quebec has a rightful place as
an independent nation.
Material: All respondents responding that the federal government’s economic
performance has been either a “poor job” or a “very poor job”. All respondents who said
that a sovereign Quebec would be better off economically than in a united Canada.
Viability: All respondents who listed as the most important reason they would vote no as
either: “fine as we are now”, “prefer known to uncertainty”, “to avoid strife”, “strength in
numbers”, “stability”, “Quebec could not survive alone economically”, “too expensive to
separate”, “fear uncertainty”, “distrust [$ANY SOVEREIGNTIST POLITICIAN]”,
“keep economic stability”, “uncertain about [$ANY SOVEREIGNTIST POLICY]”,
“Quebec is not ready for separation”, “afraid of the future if ‘YES’ wins”
Rationale: The outcome question was chosen because it reflects strong yes and lean yes
for who would vote for an independent Quebec. The status concern question was chosen
because the use of “rightful” suggests both/either that there is a parity concern between
Canada and Quebec and/or some indignation has prompted a self-government interest in
Quebec. The material question was chosen because it very closely models the intent of
my definitional operationalization – that is, it measures how much of the blame the
potential secessionists place on the central government. The viability questions were
chosen because it encompasses any potential reason – economic, political and
geopolitical realism – that individuals would think Quebec is unviable as an independent
state. Critically, this percentage is subtracted from 100%, because presumably the other
No respondents did not think viability was an issue, and obviously all Yes respondents
think an independent Quebec is viable.

4. Catalonia
Source: Centre d’Estudis d’Opinio, Anuari 2011, Anuari 2012, Anuari 2013, Anuari
2014, Anuari 2017. These are annual reports from the Catalan government’s statistics and
polling office.
Outcome: All respondents who answered that they should Catalonia should be an
independent state.
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Status: All respondents who thought there was an insufficient level of autonomy in
Catalonia. For the year 2014 this question was not asked, and I instead used those
respondents who identified as more Catalan than Spanish or only Catalan.
Material: All respondents who answered that the biggest problem facing the Catalan
economy is “unemployment and precarious employment”.
Viability: All respondents who listed their reason for saying they would vote no on a
referendum for Catalan independence as one of either: “not positive for Catalonia,” “no
firm plan established for independence, “Catalonia would be unviable [as an independent
state]”, “the process [for independence] would not be viable”, or that it would “worsen
the outlook for Catalonia” AND those listing their reason for saying they would abstain
on such a referendum as one of either: “Catalonia would be unviable [as an independent
state]” or “the process [for independence] would not be viable”.
Rationale: Given the extreme level of surrogacy in these questions, much more
justification here is warranted. First, although Catalonia did indeed have a referendum on
independence in 2017, it was unconstitutional according to their Constitutional Court.
Moreover, the unionist parties encouraged their supporters to stay home and the Spanish
police raided polling stations, forcing the turnout rate to 42%. Between the purposive
abstentions (by not voting) and the repression from the central state, such a referendum
would not be representative of the whole nation. The status question was chosen because
interviews I conducted with Catalan autonomist and secessionist parties suggest that
Catalans view the Spanish state’s refusal to grant more autonomy as an affront to the
historical independence of Catalonia and a refusal to recognize them fully. As a result,
many Catalans undoubtedly conflate the inability to fully self-govern with status
concerns. The material concerns question was chosen because, again through interviews
conducted, many Catalans believe that either lack of action or bad action from the
Spanish government was responsible for any change to Catalan employment numbers.
The viability concern question was chosen because it quite literally provides an option on
viability. Unfortunately, it splits this option between concerns over viability of a Catalan
state and the viability of the process which would need to be undergone for
independence. It also provides options relating to geopolitical and economic
independence. It is reasonable to think that many respondents had all of these reasons in
mind, because the survey allowed selection of only one option. Critically, this percentage
is subtracted from 100%, because presumably the other No respondents did not think
viability was an issue, and obviously all Yes respondents think an independent Catalonia
is viable.

Year
2011
2012
2013
2014
2017

Table 8. Showing the percentages used once more
Outcome
Status
Material
Viability
45.4
33.2
41.8
47.1
57.0
71.6
62.1
70.1
54.7
62.2
60.9
52.5
64.1
75.3
58.5
80.6
48.7
39.7
24.5
35.2
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